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Classifying de facto exchange rate regimes of financially open and closed 
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Marek A. Dąbrowski*, Monika Papież†, Sławomir Śmiech‡ 
 
Abstract 
This paper offers a new de facto exchange rate regime classification that draws on the strengths of 
three popular classifications. Its two hallmarks are the careful treatment of a nexus between exchange 
rate regime and financial openness and the use of formal statistical tools (the trimmed k-means and k-
nearest neighbour methods). It is demonstrated that our strategy minimises the impact of differences between 
market-determined and official exchange rates on the ‘fix’ and ‘float’ categories. Moreover, it is more suited to 
assess empirical relevance of the Mundellian trilemma and ‘irreconcilable duo’ hypotheses. Using comparative 
analysis we find that the degree of agreement between classifications is moderate: the null of no association is 
strongly rejected, but its strength ranges from low to moderate. Moreover, it is shown that our classification is 
the most strongly associated with each of the other classifications and as such can be considered (closest to) a 
centre of a space of alternative classifications. Finally, we demonstrate that unlike other classifications, ours 
lends more support to the Mundellian trilemma than to the ‘irreconcilable duo’ hypothesis. Overall, our 
classification cannot be considered a variant of any other de facto classification. It is a genuinely new 
classification. 
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1. Introduction 
The choice of an exchange rate regime is one of the focal issues in international 
macroeconomics. Suffice it to say that according to one of the prominent hypothesis, it was 
structural flaws of the interwar gold standard that made the Great Depression so severe and 
prolonged (Bernanke and James, 1991). More recently, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) explained 
that the exchange rate is ‘the single most important relative price, one that potentially feeds 
back immediately into a large range of transactions.’ In his survey paper Rose (2011, p 671) 
claimed, however, that ‘such choices [of the exchange rate regime] often seem to have 
remarkably little consequence. Exchange rate regimes are flaky: eccentric and unreliable.’ An 
intriguing example of such ‘little consequence’ was provided by Rey (2015/2018). She 
claimed that the choice of the exchange rate regime ceased to be important for countries with 
open capital accounts and the trilemma had been transformed into dilemma. 
We think that the confusion about ramifications of exchange rate regime choices – at least 
part of it – stems from the difficulties economists encounter when they attempt to classify 
actual exchange rate regimes. On the one hand, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) argued that ‘the 
spectacular expansion of world capital markets’ made the fixed exchange rate a ‘mirage.’ On 
the other hand, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) discerned the ‘fear of floating’ syndrome. More 
generally, declared (de jure) and actual (de facto) exchange rate regimes could not be the 
same: using Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger’s (2005) terminology ‘words’ do not necessarily 
match ‘deeds.’ Harms and Kretschmann (2009) argue that ‘the confusing variety of results’ 
concerning consequences of exchange rate regimes is due to the fact that alternative 
classification schemes reflect fundamentally different aspects of exchange rate policy. Official 
announcements (‘words’) can have different economic effects than the active exchange rate 
stabilization (‘deeds’) and yet different than de facto volatility of the relevant exchange rate 
(‘outcomes’). 
The three well-known classifications of de facto exchange rate regimes were developed by 
the IMF, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004; in what follows RR) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2005; in what follows LYS).1 The IMF’s classification was based on officially reported 
arrangements till 1998. Starting in 1999 the IMF has adopted a hybrid approach: a country is 
classified in line with its declared exchange rate arrangement, if it is consistent with observed 
policies and outcomes.2 In case of inconsistency, a country is classified by the IMF’s staff on 
                                                          
1 The IMF classification is updated in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
The other two have recently been updated in Ilzetzki et al. (2017) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2016). 
2 For more on the evolution of categories used in the IMF’s classification see, e.g., Klein and Shambaugh (2010, 
pp. 31-36) or Habermeier et al. (2009). 
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the basis of ‘the observed behavior of the exchange rate, complemented by information on the 
monetary and foreign exchange policy actions taken by country authorities’ (Habermeier et 
al., 2009). The RR classification is mainly based on the behaviour of a parallel exchange rate 
as it is considered ‘a far better barometer of monetary policy than is the official exchange rate 
[… and …] is often the most economically meaningful rate’ (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004, p. 
2). Two other important features of their approach are that they (i) use extensive chronologies 
of the history of exchange arrangements and related factors (exchange controls, currency 
reforms, anchor currencies); (ii) include a separate ‘freely falling’ category for countries 
whose annual inflation is above 40%. The LYS classification combines information on 
volatility of three variables: the level of the exchange rate, its changes, as well as foreign 
exchange reserves. The two distinguishing features of their approach are that they: (i) employ 
a statistical methodology to identify clusters of pegs, floats and intermediate regimes; (ii) 
allow for an ‘inconclusive’ category if volatilities examined are very low as the exchange rate 
and reserves stability may simply reflect an absence of shocks.3 
The main contribution of this paper is that it offers a new de facto classification of 
exchange rate regimes that draws on the strengths of the three popular classifications. First, 
unlike many other classifications, the IMF’s and LYS employ more data than just those on the 
nominal exchange rate. This is in line with Frankel and Wei’s claim that ‘judging a country’s 
exchange rate regime […] by looking simply at variation in the exchange rate’ is ‘the folly’ 
(Frankel and Wei, 2008, p. 390). Thus, we follow IMF’s and LYS approach and use data on 
foreign reserves as well. Second, both the RR and LYS classifications allow for special 
categories that prevent unfounded or far-fetched precision. Our classification has the 
analogues of both ‘freely falling’ and ‘inconclusive.’ Interestingly, our ‘under pressure’ 
category – the analogue of the former – is identified with the algorithm employed and does 
not require additional data. As such it is robust to an objection raised by Harms and 
Kretschmann (2009) who claimed that a ‘freely falling’ category is ‘problematic’ due to the 
use of the arbitrary threshold of 40%. Third, economists have been rather economical with the 
employment of statistical tools to classify exchange rate regimes. Out of the well-known 
classifications only the LYS one is constructed with the usage of formal statistical methods 
(cluster analysis).4 We borrow their idea, but come up with a substantially different 
                                                          
3 Some other exchange rate regimes classifications include: a de facto classification (Bubula and Ötker-Robe, 
2002), a ‘consensus classification’ (Ghosh et al., 2002), a bivariate classification (Shambaugh, 2004), a 
classification based on a ‘regression method’ (Bleaney and Tian, 2017). 
4 For a different approach based on statistical methodology see, e.g., Bleaney and Tian (2017). They, however, 
use simple regressions for the nominal exchange rates only. 
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classification strategy. There are three fundamental differences: (i) empirical standards of 
fixed and floating exchange rate regimes are derived from data for financially open economies 
only, whereas those that are financially closed are classified in subsequent steps in a way that 
does not distort those standards; (ii) the presence of outliers is tackled in a formal and 
impartial way, as we use the trimmed k-means method; (iii) no intermediate regimes are 
identified since empirical results provide little evidence of such a cluster. 
Apart from the development of a new de facto exchange rate regime classification, we 
compare our classification with three other popular classifications developed by the IMF, RR 
and LYS. The three important findings can be summarised as follows. First, using formal 
statistical measures we confirm the finding of previous studies that the degree of agreement 
between alternative classifications, including ours, is moderate, although classifications 
remain similar enough to make it possible to reject the null of no association between them.5 
Second, we carry out an array of pairwise comparisons of alternative classifications and show 
that ours is the closest counterpart to each of the remaining classifications. Thus, our 
classification can be considered – to put it vividly – (closest to) a centre of a space of 
alternative classifications. Third and most importantly, it is demonstrated that the split into 
financially open and closed economies – which is a hallmark of our classification – brings 
about several important empirical consequences. The most important one concerns the 
relation between the exchange rate regime and monetary independence: it is shown that unlike 
the LYS classification, ours lends more support to the Mundellian trilemma than to the 
‘irreconcilable duo’ hypothesis. Additionally, these three findings imply that our classification 
cannot be considered a variant of any other classification. This, on second thoughts, is not so 
surprising given fundamental differences between our approach and other approaches. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 covers the details of empirical strategy used to 
construct the classification of exchange rate regimes. Statistical tools employed and data that 
underlie our classification are shortly discussed in Section 3. Empirical results that encompass 
construction of our classification and its comparison with the alternatives are reported in 
Section 4. Given the importance of financial openness in our classification, Section 5 explains 
empirical implications of classifying separately open and closed economies. Conclusions are 
presented in the final section. 
 
                                                          
5 See, e.g., Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2013) or Klein and Shambaugh (2010). 
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2. Empirical strategy 
Empirical strategy employed consists of seven steps: (1) identification of an anchor currency; 
(2) division of country-year observations into financially open and financially closed; (3) 
choice of classification variables and constrained standardization; (4) clustering of financially 
open country-years; (5) reclassification of ‘inconclusives;’ (6) classification of financially 
closed country-years; (7) supplementary reclassification. 
 
Identification of an anchor currency 
First, it is important to identify the anchor (reference) currency. In this step we followed the 
approach similar to that of Frankel and Xie (2010) and used regression analysis to estimate 
flexibility of exchange rates of a given currency against potential anchor currencies: the euro, 
Japanese yen, pound sterling and US dollar. 
To formalize the choice of the anchor (reference) currency, we run the set of regressions of 
the form (cf. Frankel and Wei, 2008 and Frankel and Xie, 2010):6 
t
i
tiit XH    ,loglog         (1) 
where tH  is the exchange rate of a currency under consideration, tiX ,  is the exchange rate of 
potential anchor currency i,   is an operator of a monthly change, and t  is an error term. 
Following Frankel and Wei (1994), all exchange rates are against an ‘outside’ currency – the 
Swiss franc. The main anchor currencies are considered, i.e. the euro, Japanese yen, pound 
sterling and US dollar, but in some cases we also include the Australian dollar, South African 
rand, Indian rupee and SDR.7 The regressions are run on three-year moving windows, i.e. for 
each country-year we use monthly data for a given year and two adjacent years in order to 
avoid spurious switches from one anchor currency to another and have enough degrees of 
freedom. The anchor currency was identified as the one with the coefficient closest to unity, if 
it was statistically significant. In many cases it was the coefficient with the highest t-statistics. 
 
Division of country-year observations into financially open and financially closed 
Second, the country-year observations were split into two groups with respect to the openness 
to capital flows. The rationale behind the split is threefold and the arguments are related to the 
                                                          
6 We do not require coefficients to sum up to unity. 
7 This is a similar set to the one considered in the literature. See, e.g., RR (2004), LYS (2005). 
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Mundellian macroeconomic trilemma according to which a free movement of capital, the 
fixed exchange rate and autonomous monetary policy cannot be reconciled.8 
Firstly, in a financially closed economy the exchange rate variability should, in principle, 
be lower than in an economy with an open capital account even if the monetary authority does 
not engage directly in the exchange rate stabilization. It is simply because a closed economy 
is insulated to a greater extent against shocks propagated via capital flows than an open 
economy. Thus, when trying to classify countries on the basis of empirical evidence on 
exchange rate variability one risks that the group of peggers will be dominated by financially 
closed countries whereas those that are financially open will be squeezed into the group of 
floaters. More formally, the choice of centroids around which the clusters were constructed 
and the partitioning into groups would be distorted in that sense that they would be driven by 
capital openness rather than the actual exchange rate regime. 
Secondly, capital controls have more often than not been imposed to strengthen the 
monetary authority control over the exchange rate. The unintended consequence could be the 
emergence of a dual or parallel market. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004, p. 2) argued that ‘any 
classification algorithm that fails to distinguish between unified rate systems (with one 
official exchange rate and no significant “black” or parallel market) and all others is 
fundamentally flawed’ and based their classification on a dual or parallel exchange rate which 
they considered ‘the most economically meaningful rate.’ According to Shambaugh (2004), 
however, such an approach, merges information about barriers to capital flows and the 
exchange rate regime.9 Our approach meets both challenges. On the one hand, we clearly 
distinguish between financial openness and the exchange rate regime and on the other hand 
the approach is free of a ‘fundamental flaw’ as the categories used in the classification are 
derived from the data for financially open economies, i.e. those in which disparities between 
market-determined and official exchange rates are not observed. 
Thirdly, an important argument against the trilemma has been put forward by Rey 
(2015/2018, 2016). She claimed that ‘[w]henever capital is freely mobile, the global financial 
cycle constrains national monetary policies regardless of the exchange rate regime’ (Rey, 
2015/2018). Taking that argument seriously one should recognize that the issue of capital 
account openness could be a central one when trying to re-examine the importance of the 
exchange rate regime, especially for monetary autonomy.10 Thus, it is the classification that is 
                                                          
8 For a recent discussion of this trilemma (and others) see, e.g., Bordo and James (2017). 
9 Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) admitted that dual/parallel rates had been usually accompanied by exchange 
controls. 
10 See, e.g., Edwards (2015) for evidence from Latin American countries with flexible exchange rates. 
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built on the basis of data for countries which allow for free capital movement that seems the 
most appropriate in research on the validity of Rey’s hypothesis irrespective of an a priori 
judgement on the hypothesis. In other words, empirically identified standards of both fixed 
and floating exchange rate regimes should be derived from observations for economies that 
are financially open. Otherwise, a comparative analysis of de facto exchange rate regimes, 
regardless of the results obtained, could be undermined with the argument that what was 
compared was not exchange rate regimes but capital account openness. 
 
Choice of classification variables and constrained standardization 
The third step of our strategy is the selection of variables used to construct the 
classification. It may seem natural to use data on the exchange rate variability when building 
the de facto exchange rate regime classification. In principle, such an approach underlies the 
two popular exchange rate classifications developed by RR and Shambaugh (2004).11 An 
alternative approach has been adopted by LYS: they combined information about the 
variability exchange rate and variability of the foreign exchange reserves.12 We find their 
approach appealing because of two reasons. Firstly, it fits well the definitions of fixed and 
floating exchange rate regimes that are used in the literature, because the activity of the 
monetary authorities in the foreign exchange market is considered a distinguishing feature of 
the regime.13 
Secondly, an omission of information conveyed by the foreign exchange reserves 
variability can distort the classification. The focus on the exchange rate variability only 
results, in principle, in an identification of low and high variability objects. A mapping of low 
and high exchange rate variability objects into peggers and floaters, however, is not 
unambiguous. The problem is that the low-variability group comprises not only genuine 
peggers, but also floaters with stable exchange rates due to low exchange market pressure 
(EMP). The similar problem can be observed in the high-variability group. It includes not 
only genuine floaters, but also economies whose authorities heavily intervene in the foreign 
exchange market, e.g. in order to off-load high EMP, and thus cannot be considered floaters. 
                                                          
11 See also the updated classification by Ilzetzki et al. (2017) and more recent classification by Klein and 
Shambaugh (2010). 
12 See also the updated classification in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2016). 
13 For example Stevenson (2002a, p. 250) defined the fixed exchange rate regime as the one in which ‘the 
authorities systematically intervene in the foreign exchange market, selling domestic currency and buying 
foreign exchange when there is excess demand for domestic currency on the foreign exchange market, and vice 
versa.’ A flexible exchange rate regime is a monetary framework in which ‘the authorities do not intervene in the 
foreign exchange market to peg the exchange rate’ and ‘supply and demand in the foreign exchange market 
determine the exchange rate’ (Stevenson, 2002b, p. 259). 
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Additional information about foreign exchange reserves is useful in both cases as it allows to 
refine the classification by separation of peggers from country-years that are inconclusive 
(low EMP) and floaters from countries that are subject to foreign exchange market 
turbulences (high EMP). 
Klein and Shambaugh (2010, p. 41), however, are rather sceptical about using data on 
foreign exchange reserves variability. Their point is that on the one hand the exchange rate 
stability does not require changing reserves if a country is willing to change its money supply 
or interest rates, and on the other hand changes in reserves may not be related to concrete 
commitment to the exchange rate peg if all intervention is sterilized. Their line of reasoning is 
sound, albeit its implications for applied work is rather limited as no alternative solution to the 
problems discussed above has been offered. The implication is that even two variables are not 
enough to uncover the exchange rate regime and the additional data on interest rates should be 
used. 
The problem raised by Klein and Shambaugh (2010) is not a new one. According to Tavlas 
et al. (2008, p. 949) ‘[m]ovements in interest rates (as well as other, less-conventional types 
of intervention) are the dog-that-did-not-bark variable of de facto codings based on statistical 
algorithms.’ They explain, however, that the primary reason to leave out the interest rate is the 
lack of comprehensive and reliable interest rate series for many economies over long time. 
It seems that the use of some measure of interest rate co-movements to construct the 
exchange-rate classification can be jeopardized by an additional conceptual problem: although 
an inclusion of the rate of interest fits well to the framework of macroeconomic trilemma, it is 
not quite clear how the knowledge of the behaviour of interest rate differential could be used 
to separate fixed and floating exchange rate regimes on empirical ground. Admittedly, one 
can claim that a low variability of the interest rate differential is characteristic for a fixed 
exchange rate and high for a floating rate. This, however, is true only in tranquil times. When 
the risk premium jumps the opposite pattern can be observed: a pegger can defend the 
exchange rate with a rise in the interest rate, so the differential will become more volatile – 
this is indeed the case Klein and Shambaugh (2010) refer to – whereas a floater can rely on 
the exchange rate adjustment, so the interest rate differential can remain relatively stable.14 
Moreover, even in tranquil times there can be not too much difference between peggers and 
floaters with respect to the behaviour of the interest rate differential, because a central bank 
                                                          
14 See, e.g., Dąbrowski et al. (2015) who identified the actual variant of monetary policy adopted in response to 
the global financial crisis and provided empirical evidence that the crisis resilience of emerging market 
economies was not determined by the exchange rate regime per se but by the actual variant of monetary policy. 
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may be willing to include external financial developments in its policy reaction function. This 
point was raised by Disyatat and Rungcharoenkitkul (2016, p. 214) who noted that the 
association between monetary autonomy and observed interest rate co-movements neglects 
the ‘distinction between the ability to set monetary policy independently and the willingness 
to do so’ (emphasis in the original). Thus, the degree to which a domestic interest rate vary 
with a foreign one can be used to assess monetary dependence, but not monetary autonomy, 
much less the exchange rate regime. 
The arguments we referred to above illustrate that the choice of classification variables is 
not straightforward. In our opinion, however, relaying on exchange rate series exclusively is 
an inferior strategy, especially when using a statistical algorithm, mainly because it rises the 
risk of distorting the correspondence between intended categories of fixed and floating 
exchange rate regimes and the clusters actually obtained. Taking into account both exchange 
rate and foreign exchange reserves series counteracts that risk but leaves us with two 
additional categories beyond fixed and floating rate regimes, i.e. ‘inconclusive’ and ‘under 
pressure.’ Our choice can, therefore, be considered conservative as it prevents us from being 
unduly uncompromised in the search for peggers and floaters and forces to recognize the 
ambiguous cases. 
Two measures of variability are used as classification variables. One is the average 
absolute monthly percentage change over the year t and is defined as 
  
 

12
1 1
1
,1
12
1
var
m m
mm
t
x
xx
x          (2) 
where x is the level of the exchange rate against the anchor currency or the level of the foreign 
exchange reserves. Another measure of variability is the standard deviation of monthly 
percentage changes in the year t defined as 
 
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


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m
tmt xxx        (3) 
where Δx is the percentage change in the exchange rate against the anchor currency or the 
percentage change in the foreign exchange reserves. The average monthly percentage change 
over the year t is denoted with a bar. 
Having obtained four classification variables we standardized them in order to avoid the 
risk of relying excessively on a single variable (see, e.g., Mohamad and Usman, 2013). The 
standardization was constrained in two ways. At this stage – due to the reasons explained 
above – we focused only on the country-year observations that were found to be financially 
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open. Moreover, standardization was carried out for each year separately. The reason behind 
that constraint was that the behaviour of both peggers and floaters is very likely to be quite 
different in the years of financial turbulences and in periods of tranquillity in the global 
economy. Thus, without such a constraint one risks that the algorithm would be oversensitive 
to differences between country-years that are driven by global financial conditions rather than 
by actual exchange rate regimes. 
 
Clustering of financially open country-years 
In the fourth step the cluster analysis technique is employed to detect homogeneous groups of 
country-year observations. As our objective is to construct de facto classification, i.e. the one 
which is derived from the actual behaviour of monetary authorities, the natural choice is the 
unsupervised learning algorithm such as the k-means method. Like other statistical clustering 
methods it allows to partition a large set of objects into groups that are internally 
homogenous. The basic idea behind the k-means method is to define k centroids, each of 
which – to put it informally – can be considered the centre of one of k groups, and then 
associate each data point to the nearest centroid. The main advantage of the method is that 
centroids are not imposed by a researcher but are iteratively identified within the algorithm.15 
There are two important empirical problems that plague the k-means method. First, the 
number of groups, k, is set a priori rather than determined by the algorithm, so the 
composition of clusters can change as their number is altered. Second, the location of 
centroids can be distorted by outlying observations. It is not hard to imagine that even a single 
outlier, provided that it is indeed very different from other data points, can constitute a 
separate cluster. Since the number of clusters is fixed a priori, other data points need to be 
squeezed in the remaining  clusters. Such a partitioning would be quite different from 
the one in which there are k clusters and the outlier is simply omitted. 
The theory of exchange rate regimes can be used to overcome the first problem. There are 
two standards of exchange rate regime: the fixed rate regime and the floating rate regime. The 
theory implies that the accommodation to shocks results in high foreign exchange reserves 
variability in the former regime as monetary authorities stabilize the exchange rate. The 
opposite pattern holds in the latter regime, since monetary authorities refrain from foreign 
exchange market interventions and allow the exchange rate to adjust. One, however, should 
not exclude a priori two other possibilities, i.e. the cases in which variability of both variables 
is either low or high. We label these two groups ‘inconclusive’ and ‘under pressure,’ 
                                                          
15 The k-means algorithm is explained in more detail below. 
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respectively and reconsider them in the subsequent steps of our strategy. The point is that the 
number of groups can be justified by economic considerations. 
In order to minimise the risk involved in the choice of k the statistical measure of the 
quality of partitioning such as the average silhouette can be employed. It is a joint measure of 
cohesion and separation of clusters (Rousseeuw, 1987). The silhouette is calculated for each 
observation and ranges from -1 to +1. The high value of silhouette indicates that a given 
object is well-matched to its own cluster and poorly matched to neighbouring clusters. The 
average value of silhouette shows accuracy of the clustering configuration. Small values of 
the average silhouette might indicate that number of cluster used is inappropriate. We use that 
measure to check if the theory-based choice of k fits the data. 
The presence of outliers can be remedied with ‘impartial trimming,’ i.e. self-determined by 
the data, procedure that was proposed by Cuesta-Albertos et al. (1997) (see also Gallegos, 
2002). The trimmed k-means method they developed allows for removing a certain fraction of 
the ‘most outlying’ data points. The important point to emphasize is that outliers are not 
trimmed mechanically, i.e. by an elimination of a certain fraction of upper (or lower) tail of 
data points for each of the classification variables, but are identified as the most distant from 
centroids. The important implication is that ‘impartial trimming’ allows to consider outliers 
data points that lie between clusters, which, by definition, is not possible under mechanical 
trimming.16 The explicit and objective treatment of outliers makes the trimmed k-means 
method more robust than a standard k-means method. 
The way these two problems are solved is an important difference between our approach 
and the one applied by LYS. As far as the first problem is concerned they also relied on the 
theory, but considered the cluster with high variability of both the exchange rate and reserves 
as the one corresponding to the intermediate exchange rate regime.17 To us, such a group 
includes countries that were under strong foreign exchange market pressure (if not in an overt 
currency crisis) rather than countries that placidly managed their exchange rates. 
Unfortunately, LYS did not report any statistical measure for their choice of k. 
While the differences in the number of groups can be justified by the lack of decisive 
argument, the differences with respect to the way the second problem has been dealt with 
seem to be easier to assess. LYS simply eliminated the two per cent upper tail of observations 
for each of the three classification variables and then applied the k-mean method. As 
                                                          
16 The trimmed k-means algorithm is explained in more detail below. 
17 To be precise they distinguished between two intermediate regimes: ‘crawling peg’ and ‘dirty float.’ The 
former was identified as the one with high reserves variability, high exchange rate variability, but low volatility 
of exchange rate changes, whereas the latter was characterized by high variability of all three variables. 
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explained above such an approach is less efficient in elimination of truly relevant outliers and 
thus seems to be inferior from the statistical point of view to the trimmed k-means method, 
which is used in our approach. 
 
Reclassification of ‘inconclusives’ 
One of the clusters is expected to group observations with low variability of both exchange 
rate and foreign exchange reserves which are characteristic for calm times. That cluster 
includes country-years characterized by low exchange market pressure, i.e. cases in which 
there is no need for either exchange rate adjustment or foreign exchange interventions. Thus, 
following LYS, we called this group ‘inconclusive.’ 
The problem with this group is that it hides both peggers and floaters which makes the 
classification incomplete from pragmatic point of view. LYS argued that the variability of the 
classification variables within the category ‘inconclusive’ can be exploited to unveil exchange 
rate regimes. Thus, following their line of reasoning we applied the ordinary k-means 
partitioning algorithm to that group (no trimming was called for as the outliers have already 
been eliminated in the previous step). This time, however, we set the number of groups to 
three and isolated peggers, floaters and ‘deep inconclusives.’ We have not allowed for the 
fourth category, because it would be unreasonable to attempt to identify the cases ‘under 
pressure’ in the group that in the previous step has been found to share low exchange market 
pressure. 
 
Classification of financially closed country-years 
The sixth step of our strategy deals with the country-year observations that were considered 
closed to capital flows and left aside. The reason for excluding them from the previous steps 
was to avoid an undesired impact on the partitioning, in particular the location of centroids, 
stemming from the relatively low capital account openness (see step two). The classification 
of data points corresponding to low financial openness is based on the similarity between a 
given data point and the categories identified for the financially open country-years. In 
principle, we search for the category to which a given financially closed country-year is the 
closest. 
In this step we employ the k-nearest neighbour method. It consists in finding the k nearest 
objects in some reference set and taking a majority vote among the classes of these k objects. 
The clusters obtained in the fourth step were used as the reference set and thus a country that 
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was closed to capital flows in a given year was classified to the most frequently represented 
category in the nearest neighbourhood. 
We applied the k-nearest neighbour method in a way that was symmetric to the clustering 
analysis in the previous steps, i.e. we allowed financially closed country-years to be classified 
not only into groups of peggers and floaters, but also into three remaining categories: 
‘inconclusive,’ ‘under pressure’ and outliers. 
 
Supplementary reclassification 
The last step is motivated by the similar concern to the one behind the reclassification of 
‘inconclusives,’ that is the concern about the completeness of classification. The trade-off is 
between statistical justification and completeness of the results. So far we have given the 
priority to statistical considerations – even in step five which was oriented at making the 
classification more useful from pragmatic point of view we followed the statistical algorithm. 
In the last step we abandon purely statistical approach and inspect the categories that 
potentially hide peggers and floaters, i.e. ‘inconclusive,’ ‘under pressure’ and outliers. 
Three explicit reclassifying criteria are adopted in order to control the arbitrariness of the 
procedure: (1) when the average absolute monthly change in the exchange rate in a given year 
is less than 0.01%, a country is considered to peg its currency in that year; (2) a country 
‘under pressure’ is reclassified as a pegger (floater) in a given year if in the two adjacent years 
it pegged (floated) its currency and (3) countries that joined the euro area are considered 
peggers starting the year of the euro adoption. As far as the first criterion is concerned we are 
rather conservative in the choice of the ceiling for exchange rate variability. Suffice it to say 
that some authors consider the two-per cent deviations from the central parity as consistent 
with the fixed exchange rate regime (see, e.g., Shambaugh, 2004). The annual deviations 
allowed for by the ceiling we selected would be 0.12%, which is much less than the two-per 
cent rule. Reclassification carried out under the second criterion is conditional on the results 
obtained with the k-means methods in the previous steps in that sense that it requires the 
country to be uniformly classified in the group of either peggers or floaters in the year before 
and the year after the one in which it has been found to be ‘under pressure.’ The special 
treatment of the euro area member states can be justified with the irrevocably fixed 
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conversion rates of national currencies into euro and transferring the control over monetary 
policy to the supranational institution, i.e. the European Central Bank.18 
Moreover, to increase the transparency of our strategy we present the classification in such 
a way that it is easy to recover the impact of the step considered on final results. Thus, the 
results obtained with the use of the full procedure, as well as those obtained with the 
procedure that excludes the last step are reported. 
 
3. Statistical tools and data description 
Clustering methods 
Statistical clustering methods are dedicated to detect homogeneous groups out of 
heterogeneous large samples. Ideally, the groups should be homogeneous and the differences 
between them as large as possible (see, e.g., Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990). One of the 
most frequently used clustering algorithms is the k-means method. The notion of the k-means 
method is to partition a given sample  nxx ,...,1  into k clusters by solving the minimization 
problem: 
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where  kmm ,...,1  are k point centres. All observations are assigned to the closest centres and 
then the new centres, centroids of the groups are determined. The procedure (relocation) is 
carried out as long as there is no single object which changes clusters. 
One of the main problems of k-means is the lack of robustness in samples with outlier 
observations (García-Escudero et al., 2010). The k-means algorithm has a breakdown point 
equal to zero (see García-Escudero and Gordaliza, 1999), which means that even a single 
outlier is able to completely distort the results obtained with that method. 
In order to overcome that problem the trimmed k-means method has been proposed. The 
trimming means that an  -portion of the most outlying observations are removed. It has to be 
stressed, however, that in a multivariate case, a natural geometrical order does not exist, and 
outliers cannot be seen as the ‘largest’ or ‘smallest’ observations. Removing observations 
which are extreme in a particular (single) dimension is not an optimal strategy as ‘bridge 
points’ lying between clusters could not be eliminated and the clustering results could be 
distorted. 
                                                          
18 Inclusion of the euro area member states in the group of peggers is consistent with the lack of separate 
(national) legal tender. The IMF, however, classifies the European Monetary Union as ‘free floating’ on the basis 
of ‘the behavior of the common currency’ (IMF, 2007). 
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The trimmed k-means algorithm searches for k cluster centres  kmm ,...,1  which is done by 
solving the double minimization problem: 
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where Y’s are subsets of size  1n  taken from the sample  nxx ,...,1 . As a result a 
proportion  of observations (outliers) is left unassigned. 
The algorithm of trimmed k-means consists of following steps (García-Escudero et al. 
2010): 
1. Random step: k initial centres  001 ,..., kmm  are chosen randomly. 
2. Concentration step: 
2.1 Keep the set H made of the  1n observations closest to the centres  .,...,1 lkl mm  
2.2 Partition H onto k subsets {H1,…, Hk}, where jH  contains the observations in H 
closer to the centre ljm  than to the other centres. 
2.3 Update the centres 11
lm ,…, klm 1  such that each centre 
1l
jm  is the sample mean of 
the observations in jH . 
3. Repeat Step 1 and Step 2 several times and keep the solution which minimize the 
objective function given in (5). 
 
Classification with the k-nearest neighbours method 
The aim of classification based on the k-nearest neighbours method is to predict the category 
or class of objects. It is necessary, however, to start with a set of data which classes are 
already known. Such a set is called a training set. Then, the properties of a new object are 
compared with the properties of objects in different classes. Finally, the new object is 
classified to the class which contains objects most similar to the new one. 
There are parametric and nonparametric classification methods. The first group encloses 
discrimination functions which require multivariate normality in particular classes (Welch’s 
optional rule, see Rencher 2003, p. 314). The second group includes (among others) density 
estimation method, nearest neighbour method, classification trees method. The earliest 
nonparametric classification method is k-nearest neighbour rule proposed by Fix and Hodges 
(1951). The general idea is to classify a new object using information from its nearest 
neighbour. Despite its simplicity the k-nearest neighbours method demonstrated its power in a 
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number of real domains (Kotsiantis, 2007). The algorithm of the k-nearest neighbours consists 
of four steps: 
1. A positive integer k is specified, along with a new sample. 
2. k new entries in the training set, which are closest (statistical distance is used to measure 
the distance) to the new sample, are selected.  
3. The most common classification of the entries is determined. 
4. The new sample is classified to the category determined in Step 3. 
In order to choose the value of k, it is recommended to try several values of k and to use one 
with the lowest error rate. Such an exercise is made within a training set. 
 
Data description 
The sample covers 183 countries in years 1995-2014, i.e. 3,660 country-year observations. 
The classification is based on five variables: capital openness index (developed by Chinn and 
Ito, 2006), two measures of exchange rate variability (the average absolute monthly change 
and standard deviation of monthly change), and two measures of foreign exchange reserves 
variability (the average absolute monthly change and standard deviation of monthly change). 
For data description and sources see Table 1. Due to limited data availability the sample 
included 3,068 observations. 
 
Table 1. Description of underlying variables 
Symbol Name Description Source 
KAO Capital account 
openness 
The Chinn-Ito index The updated database 
developed by Chinn 
and Ito (2006, 2008) 
EA Exchange rate 
variability I 
The average absolute monthly 
change in the exchange rate against 
an anchor currency 
Authors’ calculations 
based on data from the 
IMF 
EO Exchange rate 
variability II 
The standard deviation of monthly 
change in the exchange rate against 
an anchor currency 
Authors’ calculations 
based on data from the 
IMF 
RA FX reserves 
variability I 
The average absolute monthly 
change of foreign exchange 
reserves 
Authors’ calculations 
based on data from the 
IMF 
RO FX reserves 
variability II 
The standard deviation of monthly 
change of foreign exchange 
reserves 
Authors’ calculations 
based on data from the 
IMF 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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4. Empirical results 
New classification 
The first step of our strategy is the identification of the reference currency, i.e. the one which 
is the anchor for the domestic currency. The step is important, witness the example of 
exchange rates of the Danish krone illustrated in Figure A1 in the appendix. The choice of the 
exchange rate against the US dollar (or the nominal effective exchange rate which is not 
depicted) would result in a misleading finding that Denmark adopted a floating rate. If instead 
the euro/ECU is selected as the anchor currency, the opposite conclusion seems justified. 
The examination of monthly exchange rates resulted in finding that the US dollar was by 
far the most prevalent reference currency – its ‘share’ was above 63% (see Table A1 in the 
appendix). The euro was found to be an anchor currency for slightly fewer than 30% of 
country-year observations. In eight cases a different currency was identified as a reference 
currency: the Australian dollar for Kiribati, the South African rand for Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, Swaziland, the Indian rupee for Bhutan, and the SDR for Libya and Myanmar. Four 
cases of a switch from one currency to another were observed in our sample: Algeria switched 
in 2003 from the euro to the US dollar, Lithuania and Sao Tome and Principe switched from 
the US dollar to the euro in 2002 and 2008, respectively, and Latvia switched from the SDR 
to the euro in 2005. 
Ilzetzki et al. (2017) stressed that the distinguishing feature of their approach was that it 
placed ‘considerable emphasis on getting the currency anchor right.’ Thus, the anchor 
classification found with our algorithm was compared with anchor currencies identified by 
Ilzetzki et al. (2017).19 The common set of countries included 181 countries over 1995-2015 
period.20 The simple measure of agreement between these two anchor classifications, i.e. the 
percentage of country-years with the same anchor currency across both classifications, was 
84.7%. Less than perfect agreement was mainly driven by two reasons. First, Ilzetzki et al. 
(2017) did not identified an anchor currency for the cases labelled ‘freely falling.’ Second, 
they found that in the late 1990s some countries used the French franc and German mark as 
                                                          
19 Their ‘process of anchor currency selection’ is different than ours. In principle, they rely on the monthly, one-
year moving average of the absolute value of the change in the bilateral exchange rates relative to all candidate 
anchor currencies (Ilzetzki et al. 2017, pp. 9-13). 
20 Due to data availability we were unable to estimate an anchor currency for 14 countries that were included in 
the set of countries used by Ilzetzki et al. (2017). These countries are very small, e.g. Andorra, Liechtenstein, 
Palau, Tuvalu, or/and the data are of poor quality (if available at all), e.g. Somalia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Zimbabwe. 
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anchor currencies, whereas in our approach the ECU/euro was used.21 If we made corrections 
for both differences, the agreement is stronger, 93.1%.22 Thus, in spite of the fact that the 
different algorithms were in use, our results seem to be well in line with those obtained by 
Ilzetzki et al. (2017). This finding can be considered good news since the alternative 
approaches lend support one to another.  
In the second step we use the index of openness to capital flows developed by Chinn and 
Ito (2006 and 2008) to separate financially open economies from those that are relatively 
closed. The index is based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and takes into account four factors: the presence of multiple 
exchange rates, restrictions on current account, restrictions on capital account transactions, 
and the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. The index is constructed as the first 
(standardized) principal component of these variables and ranges from 0 to 1.23 The histogram 
of the index based on data for 183 countries in 1995-2014 is depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Capital account openness according to the Chinn-Ito index 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Chinn and Ito (2006 and 2008). 
 
There is no mechanical criterion of financial openness that can be used to split country-
year observations into financially open and closed. One can, however, observe that there is a 
lot of country-years with an index of around 0.16 and – since it is a relatively low value – 
these should be definitely considered financially closed. The next numerous group of country-
year observations is characterized by indices above 0.40. In order to avoid splitting relatively 
                                                          
21 The third, minor reason of differences was that Ilzetzki et al. (2017) used the domestic currency as an anchor 
for some countries (Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States). We cannot follow that approach 
since our objective is to identify the relevant exchange rate which by definition requires two currencies. 
22 If just one correction is introduced the agreement is also higher: 88.0% if the first correction is made and 
89.7% if the second correction is made. 
23 For details see Chinn and Ito (2008). 
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similar country-years into different categories we took an advantage of the fact that there is 
just few observations with the index between 0.16 and 0.40 and used 0.40 as a threshold 
value. Country-years with an index below it are considered financially closed and those with 
an index equal or above the threshold are treated as financially open. 
The data on exchange rates and foreign exchange reserves were used to construct the 
classification variables in the third step of the strategy. Only variables for financially open 
country-years were considered at this stage. Measures of exchange rate and reserves 
variability were standardized for each year separately. 
In the fourth step of the strategy we used the trimmed k-means method to partition country-
year observations into homogenous clusters. We made two choices: the number of clusters 
was set to four, and the fraction of observations to be trimmed was set to two per cent. The 
former choice was motivated by theoretical considerations: with basically two variables, i.e. 
exchange rate variability and reserves variability, out of which each can take a ‘low’ or ‘high’ 
value, one should expect four different clusters: ‘low/low’, ‘low/high’, ‘high/low’ and 
‘high/high’ (see Table 2). The silhouette measure for four clusters was 0.54 and was only 
slightly lower than for three or two clusters (0.61 and 0.57, respectively). Less than four 
clusters, however, seemed to be rather difficult to justify from a logical point of view, as at 
least two categories would be merged or/and one category would remain empty. It would be 
also questionable from an economic point of view as unduly restrictive: LYS, for instance, 
had even five clusters (although they did not report any statistical measure for their choice). 
 
Table 2. Expected clusters and classification criteria 
  Foreign exchange reserves variability 
  Low High 
Exchange 
rate 
variability 
Low ‘Inconclusive’ Peg 
High Float ‘Under pressure’ 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
In making the latter choice we used the fraction suggested by LYS. It should, however, be 
stressed that the way we trimmed outliers was different to the one adopted in their studies, i.e. 
mechanical elimination of outliers for each classification variable separately. We employed 
the trimmed k-means method which identifies the outliers with respect to the centroids and 
updates outliers in each iteration of the algorithm. 
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The results of cluster analysis for financially open country-years are illustrated in Figure 2. 
The axes represent the first two principal components: the first one corresponds to the 
variability of the exchange rate and the second one to the variability of foreign exchange 
reserves. After the identification of outliers (34 obs.), four groups were identified. Two of 
them are straightforward to decipher. Peggers (green crosses) experienced low exchange rate 
variability and above normal variability of foreign exchange reserves (308 obs.), whereas 
floaters (dark blue x’s) had the opposite characteristics (389 obs.) (see Figure 3). 
Interestingly, we isolated the group of observations with even greater exchange rate 
variability than that characteristic for floaters and foreign reserves variability comparable to 
that characteristic for peggers (blue diamonds; 81 obs.). According to LYS – who obtained a 
similar cluster – such observations constitute a group of countries under intermediate 
exchange rate regimes (e.g. dirty float). It is more plausible, however, that the country-years 
included in that group experienced strong foreign exchange market pressure and in some 
cases even a currency crisis. Thus, classifying them as managing their exchange rates (the 
intermediate exchange rate regime) seems to be at odds with their actual behaviour. 
Moreover, one would expect the managed exchange rate to display on average lower 
variability than the freely floating rate. This is not the case here. Thus, contrary to LYS, we 
prefer to call this group ‘under pressure.’ 
 
Figure 2. Clusters of financially open country-years 
Notes: red triangle – ‘inconclusive’; blue x – float; green cross – peg; 
light blue diamond – ‘under pressure’; black circle – outlier. 
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The most numerous group (845 obs.) included country-year observations with below 
normal variability of both the exchange rate and foreign reserves. Such characteristics are 
displayed by both peggers and floaters in calm times. Thus, the group consists of 
‘inconclusives’ (red triangles) and the question about its true composition remains open. The 
intended outcome of the fifth step of the strategy was to narrow down the degree of 
inconclusiveness. In order to do that we applied the simple k-means method (the outliers had 
been already excluded in the previous step) to divide this group into three categories: peggers 
(353 obs.), floaters (298 obs.) and ‘deep inconclusives’ (194 obs.). Their characteristics are 
reported in Figure 4. As expected, peggers and floaters are characterized by opposing 
variabilities of exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves, whereas ‘deep inconclusives’ 
experienced low variability of both classification variables. 
 
 
Figure 3. Exchange rate and FX reserves variabilities across groups identified in the first 
stage clustering 
Notes: 0 – outlier; 1 – inconclusive; 2 – float; 3 – peg; 4 – ‘under pressure.’ 
See also Table 1. 
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So far our strategy has been focused on financially open country-year which constitute 
1,657 observations. The remaining 1,411 observations were on economies that were relatively 
closed to capital flows in some years. In the sixth step of the strategy we classified them with 
the k-nearest neighbour method. We tried from two to 20 neighbours and found out that the 
fraction of wrong classifications for a training set (created from financially open countries) 
was the lowest for 13 neighbours (see Figure 5, panel b). The difference between the 
classification based on 13 neighbours and those with a different number of neighbours, 
however, was rather small: the adjusted Rand index, that measures the agreement between 
classifications, was close to unity (see Figure 5, panel a). Thus, the parameter k was set to 13, 
and financially closed country-years were divided into peggers, floaters, ‘inconclusives,’ 
country-years ‘under pressure’ and outliers. The overall results of this and previous steps are 
reported in Table 3 in columns (3) and (4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Exchange rate and FX reserves variabilities across groups identified in the 
second stage clustering 
Notes: 1 – peg; 2 – ‘deep inconclusive’; 3 – float. See also Table 1. 
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(a) Adjusted Rand index (b) Fraction of wrong classifications 
Figure 5. Clustering with the k-nearest neighbour method – diagnostics 
Note: The number of neighbours on the horizontal axes. 
 
Table 3. Details of classification of exchange rate regimes 
Category 
Financial 
openness* 
Classification after: 
Steps 1-6 Step 7 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Peg 
open 
1371 
661 
1879 (57.1%) 
1008 (53.6%) 
closed 710 871 (61.7%) 
Float 
open 
1035 
687 
1054 (32.0%) 
699 (37.2%) 
closed 348 355 (25.2%) 
‘Under pressure’ 
open 
262 
81 
76 (2.3%) 
14 (0.7%) 
closed 181 62 (4.4%) 
Inconclusive 
open 
280 
194 
182 (5.5%) 
125 (6.6%) 
closed 86 57 (4.0%) 
Outlier 
open 
120 
34 
100 (3.0%) 
34 (1.8%) 
closed 86 66 (4.7%) 
Total 
open 
3068 
1657 
3291 (100%) 
1880 (100%) 
closed 1411 1411 (100%) 
Note: * Financial openness defined with the Chinn-Ito index. 
 
24 
In the last step of the strategy we used three criteria to introduce modifications that 
increase the degree of completeness of classification. We moved 304 country-years from 
categories ‘inconclusive,’ ‘under pressure’ or outlier (altogether they include 662 obs., see 
column (3) in Table 3) to the groups of peggers (285 obs.) and floaters (19 obs.) if such a 
change was uncontroversial according to the three criteria adopted. First, the country-year was 
reclassified as a pegger if the average absolute monthly change of the exchange rate was less 
than 0.01% (230 obs.).24 Such a criterion was motivated by the assumption that such small 
movements of the exchange rate throughout a year are very unlikely in a country with open 
capital account and floating exchange rate regime. Second, the country-year ‘under pressure’ 
was reclassified as a pegger (55 obs.) or a floater (19 obs.) if in the adjacent years it belonged 
to such a category. The rationale behind it was an observation that there is some inertia in the 
choice of the exchange rate regime, i.e. monetary authorities avoid too frequent changes of the 
exchange rate regime. Third, the country-years corresponding to the euro area member states 
were added to the group of peggers (223 obs.). These were not classified in the previous steps 
due to the lack of comparable data on foreign exchange reserves (after the euro adoption part 
of reserves is transferred to the ECB and reserves denominated in euro are no longer 
considered foreign exchange reserves).25 Thus, the third criterion enabled us to limit the 
number of unclassified country-years due to the data availability (from 592 to 369 obs.). This 
is also the reason why the totals in columns (5) and (6) are greater than these in columns (3) 
and (4). 
The final results are tabulated in columns (5) and (6) in Table 3. Overall, we identified 
more peggers (57.1%) than floaters (32.0%). This result was driven by a relatively low 
incidence of floating exchange rate regime (25.2%) and a high incidence of fixed rate 
arrangements (61.7%) in financially closed economies. In countries with open capital account 
the corresponding fractions were much closer to each other (37.2% and 53.6%, respectively). 
This finding is in line with the conjecture that can be derived from the macroeconomic 
trilemma: when capital flows are controlled, it is more attractive for the monetary authorities 
to maintain de facto fixed exchange rate as it does not require scarifying monetary autonomy. 
Interestingly, the category ‘under pressure’ is more frequent when a country is financially 
closed (4.4% vs. 0.7%). This could be an indication that capital controls effectiveness is 
                                                          
24 We tried less restrictive ceilings, i.e. 0.1%, 0.25% and 0.5%, and found that they allowed for reclassifying 
additionally, 38, 90 and 176 observations, respectively. 
25 See articles 30 and 48 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank (Official Journal of the European Union, 2016/C 202/01). 
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limited and that such barriers do not isolate an economy from the foreign exchange market 
pressure. 
 
Comparative analysis 
In order to shed more light on our classification, we compared it with other exchange rate 
regime classifications. Three popular classifications were taken into account. We considered 
the classification developed by LYS since in spite of many important differences we referred 
to above, their approach can be considered to be in the same class of approaches, i.e. those 
that are based on statistical methods. It was natural to take into account the classification 
tabulated by the IMF, because it is used in the literature as a kind of a reference point. A 
detailed work by RR on exchange rate arrangements with its emphasis on market vs. official 
exchange rates is also quite popular in the literature on international economics. Recently, 
Ilzetzki et al. (2017) have updated the RR classification and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2016) have updated theirs.26 Thus, we use these updates in the comparative analysis. 
While examining the degree of agreement between alternative classifications, Klein and 
Shambaugh (2010, p. 47) transformed each classification to a dichotomous division into pegs 
and non-pegs and then, for each pair of classifications, calculated the percentage of 
observations that were classified in the same way. We followed a similar, although not 
exactly the same, way. We mapped alternative classifications into pegs and floats. In the RR 
classification hard and soft pegs were merged into pegs and intermediate regimes were 
combined with freely floating in a group of floats. The remaining two categories (‘freely 
falling’ and ‘dual market in which parallel market data is missing’) were treated as ‘other.’ In 
the LYS classification ‘inconclusives,’ some intermediate regimes (i.e. those identified in the 
second round of their procedure) and outliers were included in the category ‘other.’ In our 
classification an analogous rule was adopted – the difference was that instead of intermediate 
regimes the category ‘under pressure’ was included into ‘other.’ The details of mapping and 
sources are provided in Table 4. 
 
                                                          
26 We thank Eduardo Levy-Yeyati and Federico Sturzenegger for making their updated classification available to 
us. 
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Table 4. Alternative exchange rate regime classifications 
Classifi-
cation* 
No. of 
countries 
Period Mapping ** Source 
LYS 183 1974-
2013 
Peg – Peg 
Crawling peg (1st round) – Peg 
Dirty float (1st round) – Float 
Float – Float 
Intermediate (2nd round) – Other 
Inconclusive – Other 
Outlier – Other 
http://growthlab.cid.harvard.edu/ 
files/growthlab/files/ 
wp_319_v2.pdf 
and direct correspondence with 
Eduardo Levy-Yeyati 
IMF 201 1970-
2010 
Hard peg (1) – Peg 
Soft peg (2) – Peg 
Intermediate (3) – Float 
Freely floating (4) – Float 
http://www.carmenreinhart. 
com/data/browse-by-
topic/topics/11/ 
(accessed on 13.07.2016) 
RR 201 1940-
2016 
Hard peg (1) – Peg 
Soft peg (2) – Peg 
Intermediate (3) – Float 
Freely floating (4) – Float 
Freely falling (5) – Other 
Dual market in which parallel 
market data is missing (6) – 
Other 
http://www.carmenreinhart. 
com/data/browse-by-
topic/topics/11/ 
(accessed on 28.10.2017) 
DPS 183 1995-
2014 
Peg – Peg 
Float – Float 
Inconclusive – Other 
‘Under pressure’ – Other 
Outlier – Other 
Authors 
Notes: * LYS stands for Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger’s (2016) classification, IMF for the 
International Monetary Fund’s classification, RR for Ilzetzki et al.’s (2017) classification and 
DPS for classification by the authors; ** numbers in parenthesis in the RR and IMF 
classifications are ‘the coarse classification codes.’ 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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Table 5. New classification against the LYS classification, 1995-2013 
 LYS Classification 
Peg Float Other b) Total 
Our 
Classification 
Peg 1037 336 325 1698 
Float 221 648 51 920 
Other a) 97 81 134 312 
Total 1355 1065 510 2930 
Notes: a) Includes: ‘inconclusives’, ‘under pressure’ and outliers; b) Includes ‘inconclusives’ and 
intermediate regimes except for dirty floats and crawling pegs classified in the first round. The former 
included in ‘float’ and the latter in ‘peg.’ 
 
Table 6. New classification against the RR classification, 1995-2014 
 RR Classification 
Peg Float Other b) Total 
Our 
Classification 
Peg 1773 78 28 1879 
Float 469 542 43 1054 
Other a) 250 66 42 358 
Total 2492 686 113 3291 
Notes: a) Includes: ‘inconclusives’, ‘under pressure’ and outliers; b) Includes ‘freely falling’ and ‘dual 
market in which parallel market data is missing.’ 
 
Table 7. New classification against the IMF classification, 1995-2010 
 IMF Classification 
Peg Float Other Total 
Our 
Classification 
Peg 827 465 . 1292 
Float 164 614 . 778 
Other a) 88 160 . 248 
Total 1079 1239 . 2318 
Notes: a) Includes: ‘inconclusives’, ‘under pressure’ and outliers. 
 
In Table 5 our classification is compared against the LYS one for the overlapping period of 
both classifications, i.e. 1995-2013. The degree of agreement can be traced out on the main 
diagonal, whereas off-diagonal elements correspond to divergence between classifications. 
For example, out of 1698 country-year observations recognized by our algorithm as pegs, 
1037 were classified in the same way by LYS, which is more than 61.1%. The remaining 
observations were classified either as floats (336) or other (325) – the corresponding ‘shares’ 
were 19.8% and 19.1%, respectively. There was more agreement with respect to floats: more 
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than 70% of our floats were classified in the same category by LYS (648 out of 920). At the 
same time 221 floats can be found in a ‘peg’ category in the LYS classification (24.0%). 
Taking into account heterogeneity of the group labelled ‘other’ we do not expect too much 
agreement between classifications for this category. Indeed it is slightly more than 40%. 
The comparison between our classification and the one developed by RR is depicted in 
Table 6. The common period covered by both classifications is from 1995 to 2014. The most 
striking finding is that almost all our pegs (94.4%) were classified in the same way by RR. 
The degree of agreement is rather poor in the group of floaters as many of them can be found 
in both peg (469) and float (542) categories in the RR classification (44.5% and 51.4%, 
respectively). Interestingly, we observe that quite a lot of country-years combined in the 
category ‘other’ (i.e. ‘inconclusive’, ‘under pressure,’ outlier) can be found in the RR 
classification in the group of peggers (250 out of 358 obs.). 
In Table 7 our classification is tabulated against the IMF’s classification. Comparison is 
over 1995-2010. Similarly to the comparison with the LYS classification we find more 
agreement between floats than pegs (78.9% vs. 64.0%). Contrary to the results obtained in 
comparison with the RR classification where the ‘other’ category was  concentrated in the 
group of peggers (69.8%), here it can be found mainly in the group of floaters (64.5%). 
The measure of overall agreement can be calculated as the number of observations on the 
main diagonal to the total number of observations (apparent correct classification rate). Using 
such a measure, we found out that our classification is the most similar to the RR 
classification (71.6%). Agreement with the two other classifications was smaller, but almost 
the same (about 62%). 
We also applied alternative mapping to the one reported in Table 4. Following Klein and 
Shambaugh (2010) we used two alternative dichotomous divisions. One mapped categories 
into pegs and non-pegs and another one into floats and non-floats. The results are reported in 
Tables 8 and 9, respectively. Two general observations can be made. First, our classification 
is similar to the three others: the measure of overall agreement based on the fraction of the 
main diagonal elements to the total was found to range between 67.0% for the IMF’s 
classification to 79.0% for the RR classification (both in the mapping into pegs and non-
pegs). Second, there is more agreement between our classification and the three others with 
respect to the pegs than floats. It could be the result of stronger heterogeneity of alternative 
classifications with respect to the definition of the floating exchange rate regime than the 
definition of pegged rate regime. This can be observed in a large difference in the number of 
floats in alternative classifications: it ranged from 79 in the RR classification to around 1000 
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in the LYS classification and ours, whereas that of pegs is between 1197 in the LYS 
classification to around 1800 in our classification.27 
 
Table 8. New classification against others under mapping into pegs and non-pegs 
 LYS Classification 
(1995-2013) 
 
RR Classification 
(1995-2014) 
 
IMF Classification 
(1995-2010) 
Peg Other Total  Peg Other Total  Peg Other Total 
Our 
Class. 
Peg 1028 670 1698  1325 554 1879  744 548 1292 
Other 169 1063 1232  138 1274 1412  218 808 1026 
Total 1197 1733 2930  1463 1828 3291  962 1356 2318 
 
Table 9. New classification against others under mapping into floats and non-floats 
 
LYS Classification 
(1995-2013) 
 
RR Classification 
(1995-2014) 
 
IMF Classification 
(1995-2010) 
Float Other Total  Float Other Total  Float Other Total 
Our 
Class. 
Float 639 281 920  68 986 1054  305 473 778 
Other 395 1615 2010  11 2226 2237  206 1334 1540 
Total 1034 1896 2930  79 3212 3291  511 1807 2318 
 
Each exchange rate regime classification can be considered a set of nominal variables. The 
measure of overall agreement we used above to compare classifications is quite intuitive but 
rather a crude one. For example, it does not inform about statistical significance. Thus, we go 
beyond it and employ three other measures that were developed in statistics to describe the 
association between nominal variables: chi-square statistic, Cramér’s V and Goodman and 
Kruskal’s lambda statistic. The chi-square statistic is used to test whether two classifications 
are independent. The Cramér’s V enables us to measure the strength of the association 
between classifications. It ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no association and 1 a perfect 
association. The strength of association can also be measured with Goodman and Kruskal’s 
lambda statistic. It is a measure of proportional reduction in error in cross tabulation analysis 
                                                          
27 The IMF’s classification has not been taken into account here due to the shorter period it covers. 
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of two classifications (nominal variables). It also varies from 0 (no association) to 1 (a perfect 
association). 
The results of association analysis for all six pairs of classifications and the baseline 
mapping (see Table 4 for details) are reported in Table 10. The results do not to depend on the 
pair under consideration and can be summarised as follows. First, the null of independence 
was strongly rejected (at 1% level of significance). Classifications, therefore, are related from 
the statistical point of view. Second, the strength of association is relatively moderate, as all 
its measures are far from 1. Third, our classification seems to be the most closely associated 
with each of the remaining classifications. For example, the highest Cramér’s V for the pairs 
that involve the LYS classification was obtained for the pair that includes our classification. 
The same can be observed for other classifications, irrespective of the measure of strength of 
association applied. In other words, our classification can be treated as being closest to a 
centre of a space of alternative classifications. Fourth, the classification that is the most 
strongly associated with ours is the RR classification. It is a bit surprising since given some 
methodological affinity one could expect the strongest association with the LYS classification 
rather than with the RR one. This finding is important also because it demonstrates that the 
methodology we applied is different enough from that of LYS to bring in the classification 
that is more similar to the one developed by RR who did not employ the cluster analysis. 
Thus, our classification cannot be considered a variant of the LYS classification. 
 
Table 10. Association measures: new classification vs. alternatives under baseline mapping 
Classifications 
considered 
Period 
considered 
Pearson 
chi-square a) 
Cramér's V b) Lambda b) 
Apparent 
correct 
classification 
rate 
Our Class. vs LYS 1995-2013 820.2*** 0.374 0.356 0.621 
Our Class. vs RR 1995-2014 1,000.1*** 0.398 0.250 0.716 
Our Class. vs IMF 1995-2010 357.7*** 0.393 0.243 0.621 
LYS vs RR 1995-2013 201.1*** 0.179 0.034 0.519 
LYS vs IMF 1995-2010 240.0*** 0.320 0.115 0.547 
RR vs IMF 1995-2010 286.9*** 0.340 0.130 0.591 
Notes: a) The null hypothesis is that the two classifications are independent (no association); b) Cramér's V and 
lambda are measures ranging  from 0 to 1 (the larger the value, the stronger the association). 
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The results for two other mappings are depicted in Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix. The 
general picture remains unchanged: all classifications are related, albeit the strength of 
association is moderate at best. The point about our classification being the closest associate 
for other classifications holds in general, although it is a bit weaker than under the baseline 
mapping. 
 
5. Three arguments in favour of a new exchange rate regime classification 
One of original features of our classification is that the categories of exchange rate regimes 
have been identified with the use of financially open country-year observations only. We 
raised three arguments based on the Mundellian trilemma in favour of such an approach: (1) 
the centroid which is relevant for the peg category is not distorted by low financial openness; 
(2) the differences between market-determined and official exchange rates are do not translate 
on the ‘fix’ and ‘float’ categories; (3) the classification is more useful in examining the 
relation between the exchange rate regime and monetary independence. The empirical 
implications of these three arguments are discussed below. In order to demonstrate their 
importance we focus on the differences between our classification and the LYS classification. 
The choice of the latter as a standard of comparison has been motivated by the fact that it is 
the closest to the former with respect to the methodology adopted. The important difference, 
however, is the treatment of financial openness. 
In principle, capital controls contribute to exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves 
stability. Thus, the first argument implies that the exclusion of financially closed economies 
when constructing the standard of a fixed exchange rate regime should result in a relatively 
larger number of peggers than under the alternative approach. This implication is not too 
difficult to check. One can use the results on disagreement between classifications already 
presented in Table 8. There are 670 cases (23%) which our classification identifies as 
belonging to a ‘peg’ category and the LYS classification includes into other categories 
whereas there are only 169 cases (6%) classified in the opposite way. 
The exchange rate regimes of the Baltic States in 2008-2010 can be used as an example 
here. All are financially open economies. Under the LYS classification a one-year shift 
towards a more flexible exchange rate regime was found in 2009: Latvia and Lithuania were 
classified as floaters and the crawling peg arrangement was identified in Estonia.28 In our 
                                                          
28 One should add that all these regimes were uncovered in the second round of clustering. Interestingly, in all 
three countries the exchange rate regime in 2008 was a less flexible one, i.e. a fixed exchange rate in Estonia, a 
dirty float in Latvia and a crawling peg in Lithuania. In 2010 the exchange rate regimes found were the same as 
those in 2008 (with the exception for Latvia for which there was a missing value in 2010).  
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classification all the Baltic States were uniformly classified as peggers in 2008-2010. One can 
find some support for our coding in the ECB Convergence report. Maximum percentage 
deviations from the ERM II central rate over the reference period (24 April 2008-23 April 
2010) were -0.9% and 1.0% for Latvia and 0% for the two other Baltic States (ECB, 2010, pp. 
106, 128, 146). It should be admitted, however, that the disagreement cannot be settled 
unambiguously. After all, both classification seek to uncover the de facto exchange rate 
regime. The point is rather that our classification leaves more room for a financially open 
economy to be classified as a pegger. 
The second argument is related to the controversy over using ‘black’ market exchange 
rates. According to RR an important feature of an algorithm is to determine whether the 
exchange rate is unitary or not, whereas Shambaugh (2004) is sceptical and argues that such 
an approach merges information about capital controls (see Section 2 for details). Our 
approach meets both challenges as the categories are derived from the data for financially 
open economies and these rarely maintain non-unified exchange market. 
In order to check the importance of this argument, we used the data on unitary exchange 
market index from Ilzetzki et al. (2017).29 An index takes a value 1 if there are 
dual/multiple/parallel rates and 0 if the exchange rate is unified. Two points seem to be 
relevant in this context. First, the share of countries with non-unitary exchange rate decreased 
from 50% in the late 1980s to 25% in 1995 and was less than 15% on average in 1995-2014, 
which is the period covered by our classification.30 Second, we found that the share of 
countries with non-unitary exchange rate in financially open economies, i.e. those that were 
used to construct fix and float categories, was 6.5%.31 If we had neglected the division into 
financially open and closed economies, i.e. followed the approach of LYS, that share would 
be twice as large, 13.7%. The point is, therefore, that our approach insulates against potential 
distortionary effect of non-unitary exchange markets on classification results to a greater 
extent than the approach of LYS. 
The third argument is related to the ‘irreconcilable duo’ hypothesis put forward by Rey 
(2015/2018). She claimed that national monetary policy was constrained by the global 
financial cycle if the country was financially open, no matter which exchange rate regime was 
adopted. Rather than testing that hypothesis directly – which is beyond the scope of this study 
and would require a separate, full-length paper – we focus on the nexus between monetary 
                                                          
29 Data were obtained from Ethan Ilzetzki’s website (accessed on July 18, 2018). 
30 Ilzetzki et al. (2017) observed, however, that that share increased to almost 20% in 2015 and 2016. 
31 Alternatively, one can observe that countries with dual/multiple/parallel exchange rate were those with 
relatively closed capital accounts. See Figure A2 in the appendix. 
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independence and the exchange rate regime in financially open economies. The extent of 
monetary independence is measured with an index developed by Aizneman et al. (2013). The 
index is based on the correlation between market interest rates and ranges from 0 (perfect 
dependence) to 1 (full independence).32 
The distribution of monetary independence index in financially open economies, that is 
those for which the choice of the exchange rate regime does not matter according to the 
‘irreconcilable duo’ hypothesis, can be useful in this context. We are interested whether the 
picture obtained under our classification is qualitatively different from the one obtained under 
the LYS classification. Figure 6 depicts the distribution of monetary independence index for 
floating exchange rate regime.33 Both distributions look quite similar except for the relative 
frequency of cases with monetary independence index equal or close to zero. Under the LYS 
classification this relative frequency is very large, implying that in more than 22% of cases in 
which the floating exchange rate regime was found, there was virtually no monetary 
independence. This is not the case with our classification – there is not a single country-year 
with monetary independence equal to zero in the group of floaters and the relative frequency 
of cases close to zero is less than 0.8%.34 
For the distribution of monetary independence index under the fixed exchange rate the 
opposite pattern can be observed in Figure 7. The very low values of monetary independence 
index are not too frequent under the LYS classification: the relative frequency of cases with 
the index close to zero is 4.5% (there is not a single observation with monetary independence 
equal to zero) which is surprisingly low in comparison to the case of floating exchange rate 
regime under the same classification. The distribution under our classification looks different: 
not only are cases with the index equal to zero observed, but the relative frequency of cases 
with the index equal or close to zero is 23.5%, which is five times more than under the LYS 
classification.35, 36 
                                                          
32 Data were obtained from Hiro Ito’s website (accessed on May 1, 2017). 
33 Only country-year observations present in both classifications are included in Figures 6 and 7. Thus, the 
differences between distributions are not due to the different coverage of country-years. Distributions without the 
correction for the common coverage look very much the same and are available upon request. 
34 Distributions of monetary independence index under floating exchange rate irrespective of the degree of 
openness to capital flows are presented in Figure A3 in the appendix. The results are similar to those in Figure 6. 
35 Distributions of monetary independence index under fixed exchange rate irrespective of the degree of 
openness to capital flows are presented in Figure A4 in the appendix. The results are similar to those in Figure 7. 
36 In order to check formally the similarity of distributions we have run the Wilcoxon and Mann-Whitney test of 
equality of medians. In all cases the null of equality was strongly rejected (at the 1% significance level). Detailed 
descriptive statistics and test results are depicted in Table A5 in the appendix. 
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Figure 6. Distribution of monetary independence index under the floating exchange rate 
regime in financially open economies 
 
 
Figure 7. Distribution of monetary independence index under the fixed exchange rate regime 
in financially open economies 
35 
The results of this exercise demonstrate that taking into account capital account openness 
when building the exchange rate regime classification has important consequences. Not only 
is our classification different from the LYS classification, but these differences can feed into 
empirical findings about the relation between monetary independence and flexibility of the 
exchange rate regime. It is much easier to obtain evidence that lend support to the 
‘irreconcilable duo’ hypothesis if one uses the LYS classification rather than our 
classification. The latter classification is in turn more in line with the Mundellian trilemma. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper offers a new de facto classification of the exchange rate regimes adopted by both 
advanced economies and emerging and developing economies in the period spanning 1995-
2014. We built our classification drawing on the strengths of three popular exchange rate 
regimes classifications developed by the IMF, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2005). Following the IMF and LYS we went beyond the simple variation 
of the exchange rate and avoided in this way ‘the folly’ against which Frankel and Wei (2008) 
cautioned. Moreover, we allowed for special categories that were (imperfect) analogues of 
‘inconclusive’ and ‘freely falling’ categories in the LYS and RR classifications, respectively. 
These minimised the risk of far-fetched precision, although at the expense of classification 
completeness. Finally, we owe the idea of applying statistical tools – more specifically cluster 
analysis – to identify actual exchange rate regimes to LYS. Their studies remain – to the best 
of our knowledge – the only in the literature on exchange rate regimes in which cluster 
analysis techniques were applied. 
It goes without saying that the use of cluster analysis makes our approach substantially 
different from those employed by the IMF and RR as far as the methodology is concerned. It 
could be less clear-cut, especially at first sight, that our approach is also different from that of 
LYS. Thus, it should be emphasised that there are three fundamental differences. First, using 
the argument based on macroeconomic trilemma, we separated financially open country-years 
from those that were closed to capital flows, as only the former group could reasonably be 
used to uncover the empirical standards of fixed and floating exchange rate regimes. The 
latter group was classified in the subsequent and separate step with the method ensuring 
classification consistency (the k-nearest neighbours method). Second, we applied the robust 
clustering method when partitioning data points into groups. The trimmed k-means method 
enabled us to tackle the presence of outliers in a formal and impartial way instead of an 
arbitrary and mechanical elimination of outlying observations. Third, unlike LYS, we did not 
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isolate the group of intermediate exchange rate regimes, because the characteristics of the 
relevant cluster seemed to be typical for countries under strong foreign exchange market 
pressure rather than for either dirty floaters or crawling peggers. In other words, our 
interpretation of the relevant cluster was more in line with empirical characteristics of 
country-years included in it. There were also some other, less important differences like the 
symmetrical treatment of foreign exchange reserves and the exchange rate, the way we 
standardised data points or the time span covered. 
Given all these differences, it is hardly surprising that we found that our classification was 
different from the one worked out by LYS. It was also different from two other popular 
classifications developed by the IMF and RR – a simple measure of agreement (the apparent 
correct classification rate) ranged between 60% and 80% depending on the mapping applied. 
The formal comparative analysis resulted in three main findings. First, in line with the other 
studies we found that all classifications were only moderately related: even though the null of 
independence was strongly rejected for each pair, the strength of association ranged from low 
to moderate. Second, in a series of pairwise comparisons our classification turned out to be the 
most strongly associated with each of the other classifications. As such it can be considered – 
to put it vividly, albeit not very strictly – (closest to) a centre of a space of alternative 
classifications. Third and most importantly, we demonstrated that there are good grounds for 
the division of country-years into financially open and closed, which is a characteristic of our 
classification, as it (i) is based on a sound standard of the peg category, i.e. undistorted by low 
financial openness; (ii) minimises the impact of differences between market-determined and 
official exchange rates on the ‘fix’ and ‘float’ categories; (iii) is the most appropriate one to 
assess the importance the exchange rate regime in a debate on the validity of Rey’s hypothesis 
irrespective of an a priori judgement on that hypothesis. The most important empirical 
consequence was that contrary to the LYS classification, ours lent more support to the 
Mundellian trilemma than to the ‘irreconcilable duo’ hypothesis.  
Overall, these findings imply that the classification we developed cannot be considered a 
variant of any other de facto classification, including the LYS one. It is a genuinely new 
classification. 
The two reservations are called for in conclusion. First, our classification requires a 
refinement that would enable us to identify statistically the intermediate exchange rate regime 
category. Second, it is well known that the data on changes in foreign exchange reserves only 
imperfectly proxy for foreign exchange market interventions. We treat these reservations as 
challenges to our strategy and topics for further research. These also include the use of the 
37 
new classification to re-examine such issues as the relations between the exchange rate regime 
and: external imbalances and international competitiveness (see, e.g., Gervais et al., 2016, 
Müller‐Plantenberg, 2017, Caselli, forthcoming), international trade and global credit supply 
shocks (see, e.g., Santana-Gallego and Pérez-Rodríguez, 2019, Zeev, 2019), fiscal discipline 
(see, e.g., Chowdhury et al., 2016) output and inflation volatility (see, e.g., Ghosh, 2014, 
Hegerty, 2017) as well as political economy variables (see, e.g., Liu et al., forthcoming). 
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Appendix 
to ‘Classifying de facto exchange rate regimes of financially open  
and closed economies: A statistical approach’ 
(for on-line publication) 
 
 
Table A1. Anchor currencies, 1995-2015 
Anchor currency 
Number of 
countries* 
Countries 
Australian dollar 
(AUD) 
1 
(0.6%) 
Kiribati 
Euro 
(EUR) 
53 
(29.8%) 
Albania, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, 
Germany, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg,  FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Montenegro, 
Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San 
Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of 
America 
Indian rupee 
(INR) 
1 
(0.6%) 
Bhutan 
South African 
Rand 
(ZAR) 
4 
(2.2%) 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland 
U.S. dollar 
(USD) 
113 
(63.5%) 
Afghanistan, Angola, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, 
Armenia, Aruba, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Costa Rica, Curacao & St. Maarten, Djibouti, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, 
Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, South Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Macao, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Federated States of Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montserrat, 
Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, 
Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, 
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab 
Emirates, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia 
Special drawing 
rights 
(SDR) 
2 
(1.1%) 
Libya, Myanmar 
Change 4 
(2.2%) 
From EUR to USD: Algeria (2003) 
From USD to EUR: Lithuania (2002), Sao Tome and Principe (2008) 
From SDR to EUR: Latvia (2005) 
Notes: * percentage of total in parentheses. Anchor currencies are available in an xlsx format. 
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Table A2. De facto exchange rate regime classification, 1995-2014 
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Table A2. De facto exchange rate regime classification, 1995-2014, cont’d 
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Table A2. De facto exchange rate regime classification, 1995-2014, cont’d 
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Table A2. De facto exchange rate regime classification, 1995-2014, cont’d 
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Table A2. De facto exchange rate regime classification, 1995-2014, cont’d 
 
Notes: ‘Incon’ stands for inconclusive, ‘U_press’ – for under pressure. The classification is available in an xlsx format. 
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Table A3. Association measures: new classification vs. alternatives under mapping into pegs 
and non-pegs 
Classifications 
considered 
Period 
considered 
Pearson 
chi-square a) 
Cramér's V b) Lambda b) 
Apparent 
correct 
classification 
rate 
Our Class. vs LYS 1995-2013 647.8*** 0.470 0.309 0.713 
Our Class. vs RR 1995-2014 1,200.1*** 0.605 0.519 0.789 
Our Class. vs IMF 1995-2010 311.1*** 0.366 0.229 0.669 
LYS vs RR 1995-2013 1,000.1*** 0.566 0.516 0.342 
LYS vs IMF 1995-2010 357.1*** 0.391 0.274 0.302 
RR vs IMF 1995-2010 538.4*** 0.465 0.374 0.740 
Notes: see Table 10 in the main text. 
 
Table A4. Association measures: new classification vs. alternatives under mapping into floats 
and non-floats 
Classifications 
considered 
Period 
considered 
Pearson 
chi-square a) 
Cramér's V b) Lambda b) 
Apparent 
correct 
classification 
rate 
Our Class. vs LYS 1995-2013 685.5*** 0.484 0.308 0.769 
Our Class. vs RR 1995-2014 108.6*** 0.182 0.050 0.697 
Our Class. vs IMF 1995-2010 200.6*** 0.294 0.077 0.707 
LYS vs RR 1995-2013 71.4*** 0.151 0.039 0.672 
LYS vs IMF 1995-2010 99.3*** 0.206 0.025 0.666 
RR vs IMF 1995-2010 118.2*** 0.218 0.056 0.802 
Notes: see Table 10 in the main text. 
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Table A5. Descriptive statistics of monetary independence index under alternative exchange 
rate regime classifications 
 Financially open economies Financially closed and open economies 
 
Floating exchange rate 
regime 
Fixed exchange rate 
regime 
Floating exchange rate 
regime 
Fixed exchange rate 
regime 
Statistic DPS LYS DPS LYS DPS LYS DPS LYS 
Mean 0.4699 0.3666 0.3174 0.3979 0.4833 0.4073 0.3833 0.4298 
Median 0.4599 0.3900 0.3521 0.3987 0.4862 0.4397 0.4158 0.4506 
Maximum 1.0000 1.0000 0.9401 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9679 1.0000 
Minimum 0.0106 0.0000 0.0000 0.0166 0.0106 0.0000 0.0000 0.0113 
Std. deviation 0.2066 0.2680 0.2362 0.1993 0.1958 0.2532 0.2225 0.1912 
Skewness 0.3034 0.1505 0.0497 0.0089 0.1337 -0.1257 -0.3008 -0.2139 
Kurtosis 2.9767 2.2282 1.8869 2.4653 2.9937 2.3311 2.2307 2.7009 
         
WW-M test 
(p value in 
parentheses) 
7.1464 
(0.0000) 
6.3612 
(0.0000) 
5.9511 
(0.0000) 
4.8215 
(0.0000) 
Notes: DPS stands for our classification, LYS – for Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger’s classification; 
WW-M test stands for Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney (tie-adjusted) test; the null is that medians are equal. 
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Figure A1. Exchange rates of the Danish krone 
 
 
 
Figure A2. Distribution of the Chinn-Ito index for country-years with non-unitary exchange 
rates 
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Figure A3. Distribution of monetary independence index under the floating exchange rate 
regime in financially closed and open economies 
 
 
Figure A4. Distribution of monetary independence index under the fixed exchange rate 
regime in financially closed and open economies 
